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Articles
Christine Boyle* Sexual Assault in Abusive
Relationships: Common Sense
About Sexual History
In this paper, the author, using a hypothetical fact scenario as a focus, discusses
competing interpretations of the new "rape shield"provisions in ss. 276-276.4 of
the Criminal Code. In spite of identifying appealing arguments based on the
importance of examining context in the resolution of legal issues, she argues that
s. 276(1) should be read as barring all evidence of sexual history between the
complainant and the accused, including "pattern evidence", unless it relates to
something other than consent or credibility.
Dans son expos6, I'auteur analyse les diff6rentes interpr6tations soulev6es i
I'egard des nouvelles dispositions du Code Criminel ayant rapport a la preuve
concemant le comportement sexuel du plaignant relevant des articles 276-
276.4, a la lumiere d'une certaine situation de fait hypoth6tique. Elle identifie
certains arguments attrayants concernant l'importance d'examiner I'ensemble
des circonstances qui entourent une question en litige. En revanche, elle
maintient /a these selon laquelle 'article 276(1) doit Ctre interprdtd de favon J
exclure toute preuve du comportement sexuel ant6rieur de I'accus6 et du
plaignant, y compris toute preuve tendant a d6montrer un comportement sexuel
habituel, sauf si une telle preuve se rapporte a autre qu'une question de
consentement ou de cr~dibilit6.
Introduction
Do we need to know about a complainant's sexual history in order to
decide whether she really was sexually assaulted? This issue has been the
subject of argument and analysis for several decades now, and indeed
could be said to epitomize the challenge for feminist legal theorists to
ensure that women receive equal protection and benefit of the law. It is
an issue which resists resolution. Provisions protecting complainants
from unrestricted questioning about their sexual history were first intro-
duced in the reform of the law of sexual assault in the early eighties. These
were struck down as infringing an accused's right to a fair trial in
* Professor of Law, University of British Columbia, Associate Counsel, Smart & Williams,
Vancouver. The author would like to thank Marilyn MacCrimmon, Cara Sweeney and
Archibald Kaiser for their help with this paper.
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R. v. Seaboyer.' The legislative response to Seaboyer can be found in
sections 276-276.4 of the Criminal Code,2 which sections are, them-
selves subject to constitutional challenge.3 As will be discussed later, the
scope of section 276 is contentious, but it is clear that it creates some sort
of exclusionary rule where sexual history evidence relates to consent or
credibility.
Given the need for frequent references to section 276 in particular, its
three components are set out here.
Subsection (1) states when sexual history evidence is not admissible:
(1) In proceedings in respect of [listed sexual offences] evidence that
the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with the accused
or with any other person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by
reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant
(a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the
subject-matter of the charge; or
(b) is less worthy of belief.
Where evidence is not excluded under (1), sub-section (2) establishes a
balancing exercise following which sexual history evidence may be
excluded or admitted.
(2) In proceedings in respect of an offence referred to in subsection (1),
no evidence shall be adduced by or on behalf of the accused that the
complainant has engaged in sexual activity other than the sexual activity
that forms the subject-matter of the charge, whether with the accused or
with any other person, unless the judge, provincial court judge or justice
determines, in accordance with the procedures set out in sections 276.1 and
276.2, that the evidence
1. (1991), 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Seaboyer]. The majority stated at 155: "As
all counsel on these appeals accepted, the reality in 1991 is that evidence of sexual conduct...
in itself cannot be regarded as logically probative of either the complainant's credibility or
consent. Although they still may inform the thinking of many, the twin myths which s.276
sought to eradicate are just that-myths-and have no place in a rational and just system of
law." For comment on the construction of relevance that leads decision-makers to see such
aspects of a complainant's life as her sexual and psychiatric history as relevant to whether she
has been sexually assaulted, see T. Dawson, "Sexual Assault Law and Past Sexual Conduct of
the Primary Witness: The Construction of Relevance" (1987-88) 2 C.J.W.L. 310, S. Bond,
"Psychiatric Evidence of Sexual Assault Victims: The Need for Fundamental Change in the
Determination of Relevance" (1993) 16 Dal.L.J. 416, D. Majury, "Seaboyer and Gayme: A
Study In Equality" in J. Roberts and R. Mohr, eds., Confronting Sexual Assault: A Decade of
Legal and Social Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) at 268.
2. S.C. 1992, c. 38, s. 2.
3. See R. v. Darrach, [ 1994] O.J. Nos. 3161 and 3162 (Ont. Ct. of Justice Prov. Div.), reported
as R. v. A.S.D. (1994), 28 C.R. (4th) 201 (Ont.Prov. Div.), presently before the Ontario Court
of Appeal. The author is co-counsel to a coalition intervening in the case.
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(a) is of specific instances of sexual activity;
(b) is relevant to an issue at trial; and
(c) has significant probative value that is not substantially out-
weighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of
justice.
Subsection (3) sets out the factors which a judge must consider before
deciding such evidence is admissible under s. 276(2):
(3) In determining whether evidence is admissible under subsection (2),
the judge, provincial court judge or justice shall take into account
(a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make
a full answer and defence;
(b) society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault
offences;
(c) whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will assist
in arriving at a just determination in the case;
(d) the need to remove from the fact-finding process any discrimina-
tory belief or bias;
(e) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of preju-
dice, sympathy or hostility in the jury;
(f) the potential prejudice to the complainant's personal dignity and
right of privacy;
(g) the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal
security and to the full protection and benefit of the law; and
(h) any other factor that the judge, provincial court judge or justice
considers relevant.4
One significant, and innovative, aspect of these provisions is that they
cover sexual history between the accused and the complainant. A range
of issues has arisen since these sections were passed, but the focus of this
paper is on their applicability to situations where the accused and the
complainant are, or were, cohabitees. I will concentrate on the abusive
relationship since this seems most realistic in its potential for sexual
assault. However, I will be referring to other possibilities, for instance
relationships in which there are sexual practices likely to be perceived as
unusual or even deviant.
While the issues are technical on one level, on a more significant level
they relate to the sexual autonomy and sexual accessibility of people in
relationships. Rules of evidence which suggest that one needs to look at
the sexual history of a relationship in order to determine whether there
4. Emphasis added. Sections 276.1-3 then deal with certain procedural and publication
matters.
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was consent on a particular occasion tend to dilute the substantive law that
there must be consent on each occasion. If, for example, a woman who has
had sex with her abusive partner is less likely to be believed when she says
that he raped her than a woman raped by a stranger then the law is
instrumental in creating categories of women to whom some men have
privileged access irrespective of their wishes. An inference that people
who have had sex in the past give some kind of on-going consent looks
very like an evidentiary version of the old marital exemption, wherein the
Crown had to first prove that the alleged victim was "not his wife".5
What we think of as having probative value in this context will of
course have substantive outcomes in terms of who is granted protection
by the law of sexual assault. There is a danger that certain groups of
women, that is women in relationships (and I will suggest later those who
engage in "distinctive" sexual practices) will not be protected to the same
extent as women who testify to being sexually assaulted by strangers.
Another way of stating the issue is to ask whether if women in relation-
ships want the protection of the law of sexual assault, they have to end the
relationship, because as long as they are still involved (or only recently
out of it) the law will see them as sexually accessible to their partners?
Analysis of the admissibility of sexual history in this context is likely
to be distinctive. Where a woman says she was sexually assaulted by her
partner and her sexual history with that partner is examined there may be
less danger of the distorting effect of the unchaste woman stereotype.
There is less scope for the 'she is a tramp so she must have consented' line
of reasoning and there may be more receptiveness to arguments for
admission. Another way of putting this is that there is less general
understanding of the harm that may flow from admission. While debate
continues about the admissibility of sexual history evidence generally, I
think it is fair to say that there is increased understanding that relying on
the "twin myths" identified in Seaboyer (that unchaste women are more
likely to consent to intercourse and are less worthy of belief) has
significant costs. In my view the inclusion of accused-complainant
evidence in Seaboyer was not grounded in a similar shift in perception.
So it may be useful at this stage to state the harms of admitting propensity
(to have sex in particular ways or in particular contexts) evidence about
the relationship between the complainant and the accused.
5. The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, C-34, s. 143, repealed by the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 125, s. 6.
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First, a fact finder may not pay sufficient attention to the fact that
propensities only manifest themselves intermittently.6 This is a particular
concern here, since as I shall argue later, it is not feasible to admit the
whole story (or competing stories) of a relationship. Second, a fact finder
may feel that sex does not matter if it happened before and err on the side
of acquittal because of indifference to harm. The fact that certain
information may affect our sense of regret at the prospect of a wrong
decision is a familiar form of prejudice.
These are very general comments. What follows is a factual scenario
designed to provide a practical focus.
John (23) and Mary (21) lived together until they split up last July. While
they were together, they would occasionally have disagreements, and
sometimes John would assault Mary while he was angry. At other times
they would get on well and at these times they were optimistic that they
could work things out.
In August, John called Mary and asked her to come to see him to talk things
over. She went to his apartment one evening. Their conversation became
a quarrel. John became very angry and punched Mary several times in the
face, injuring one eye and causing her lip to bleed. Later Mary went to the
police and reported that John had assaulted her and forced her to have
sexual intercourse during the assault.
John was later charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm contrary
to section 272(c) of the Criminal Code.
At the beginning of the trial John's lawyer made an application to lead
evidence of John and Mary's sexual history. John admitted assaulting
Mary, but wished to lead evidence of a pattern of their behaviour prior to
the assault. The pattern alleged was that John would assault Mary and that
later consensual sex would take place as an aspect of reconciliation. The
defence argument was that consensual sex was so "weird" after an assault
that it was essential to make full answer and defence to present evidence
to the jury that this had happened on previous occasions.
The Crown objected and the trial judge held this evidence to be inadmissible. 7
6. A passage in J. Sopinka, S. Lederman & A. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) at 520, in the discussion of the similar fact rule, captured my
concern. "While evidence of the general disposition of individuals is not admissible, the lesser
species, whose conduct is allegedly more predictable, are subject to the same rules as places
and things. Thus, the propensity of an animal to bite people is admissible in order to establish
the negligence of the owner." Emphasis added.
7. An issue which does not need to be addressed in this paper is whether the trial judge should
hold a voir dire to determine admissibility on these facts or whether it is so obvious that the
evidence is inadmissible that such a hearing is not necessary. In a case with similar facts in
British Columbia, the trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible without a hearing. In R. v.
Wellman, [ 1996] B.C.J. No. 1478, appeal allowed on other grounds, the author was co-counsel
for the respondent Crown on the appeal.
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At the trial, John and Mary testified to quite different versions of what
happened.
Mary said that John punched her in the face and knocked her to the ground.
He then proceeded to force sexual intercourse on her, while she was
distressed and protesting. Later, she made a report to the police.
John said that as soon as he hit her he moved away to another room and sat
crying and feeling remorseful. Mary then came and comforted him. He
said that he felt terrible. Mary said that they both had problems but she
thought that with help they could each work through these problems. Mary
then went and cleaned up her face. While she was doing this, John went to
lie down on the bed. Mary joined him there and initiated sexual contact.
They then had consensual sexual intercourse.
John was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm.
He has now appealed on the basis that the trial judge was in error in holding
that the evidence was inadmissible.
Is the alleged pattern of sexual behaviour between John and Mary
admissible? Decisions about this issue may depend on what we think is
normal behaviour. For instance, it could be argued that it is "common
sense" that people do not consent to sex after being beaten up and so the
evidence of a pattern is necessary to disabuse the finder of fact of such a
mistaken assumption.
This scenario raises a number of questions in my mind. What we
consider common sense may depend a lot on what we think happens in
abusive relationships and on a construction of the rapist as stranger.8
What common sense assumptions should we assume the fact finder
(whether a jury or a judge sitting alone) might make? How can one argue
about what we assume they assume? What should the defence be
permitted to do to counteract such assumed assumptions? In particular,
should the defence be permitted to lead sexual history evidence by
analogy to, and by extension of, Lavallee?9 A great deal of attention has
8. There is an extensive literature on the role of schemas in fact finding generally. Scripts are
a type of schema and are a set of expectations about how others may act in conventional
situations. See, e.g. M. MacCrimmon, "Developments in the Law of Evidence: The 1988-89
Term. The Process of Proof: Schematic Constraints" [1990] 1 Sup. Ct. L.R. (2d) 345 at 351.
9. In Lavallee v. R. (1990), 55 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) a majority of the S.C.C. was of the view
that the battering relationship is subject to a large group of myths and stereotypes. As such it
is beyond the ken of the average juror and suitable for explanation through expert testimony.
It seems clear that on the basis of Lavallee the defence in our hypothetical could call expert
testimony to show that sex does indeed occur in battering relationships. The defence might
however argue that it should be able to call even better evidence of the actual relationship in
question. With respect to the stranger being part of the "common sense" view of violence
against women, authoritative sources have discredited this supposition.
"When women are victims of [violent crimes] most occur in their own homes [and are
committed] by someone they know, quite often a spouse." Canadian Centre for Justice
Statistics, "Violent Crime in Canada" (1996), 16(6) Juristat, at 2.
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been paid in the feminist legal literature to "contextualization".I0 Should
not the defence be able to "contextualize" the question of what actually
happened between John and Mary?
That question can be broken down into two interconnected issues. Was
the sexual contact consensual? When did that sexual contact take place?
John's story is of later, consensual sex, while Mary's is of intermingled
assault and sexual assault.
I. The Consent Issue
The starting place for analysis of the question of whether the John's
lawyer can lead evidence of a previous pattern of sexual activity is section
276(1). It states that "evidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual
activity... with the accused... is not admissible to support an inference
that, by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant (a) is
more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject-
matter of the charge...."
At first glance it would appear that this bars the pattern evidence, if it
is seen as going to consent. The fact finder is not permitted to reason from
consent in the past to consent on the occasion in question. It is my view
that any such reasoning is inconsistent with the sexual autonomy of
sexual partners, which must presume the need for a new consent for every
sexual encounter. However, it is far from clear whether section 276(1)
will have this effect.
This is partly because section 276(2) then goes on to set certain
conditions, of specificity, relevance and probative value not outweighed
by the danger of prejudice, for admissibility. Does this mean that some or
all consent evidence is admissible if these conditions are met, as an
exception to section 276(1), or is section 276(2) only relevant to evidence
not already excluded by section 276(1), for instance, that relating to
mistaken belief in consent or identity?
Focusing on consent for ease of discussion, one can state the issue in
another way. Is section 276(1) an absolute bar to 'consent' evidence, so
that the defence must point to something other than consent to move on
to section 276(2)? Or does section 276(2) qualify section 276(1), so that
"Women were more likely to be sexually assaulted by someone known to them then by
a stranger." Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, "Criminal Justice Processing of
Sexual Assault Cases" (1994), 14(7) Juristat, at 3.
10. The classic reference is to J. McCalla Vickers, "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile: The
Methodological Rebellions of Feminist Research" in A. Miles and G. Finn, eds., Feminism in
Canada:from Pressure to Politics (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982).
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if its tests are satisfied, in relation to the factors under s.276(3), then
consent evidence is admissible?
Any discussion of this has to take place with Seaboyer in the back-
ground. It provides the constitutional underpinnings of the new provi-
sions and is used as a guide to interpretation. The debate over the structure
of section 276 with Seaboyer in mind already appears in the academic
literature. An early comment on Seaboyer, written by myself and Profes-
sor Marilyn MacCrimmon," is implicitly relevant to section 276. The
majority in Seaboyer was of the view that sexual history evidence is
sometimes relevant, but that "it may be important to remind jurors that
they not allow the allegations of past sexual activity to lead them to the
view that the complainant is less worthy of belief, or was more likely to
have consented for that reason. 1 2 How would jurors then be able to use
the evidence? The majority listed a number of possibilities including
mistaken belief in consent. The most relevant possibility is that of similar
act evidence. Here the majority stated:
Evidence of prior sexual conduct which meets the requirements for the
reception of similar act evidence, bearing in mind that such evidence
cannot be used illegitimately merely to show that the complainant con-
sented or is an unreliable witness. 3
In our article, we argued for the rejection of even strikingly similar
conduct as involving a generalization based on disposition, interpreting
Seaboyer to prohibit any generalization that the complainant had a
disposition to consent. We emphasized the comment of Madame Justice
L'Heureux-Dubd, that consent is to a person and not to a circumstance.' 4
We suggested that the similar act scenario could be given meaning that
did not involve the prohibited propensity inference by confining it to
situations where the sexual conduct was inextricably intertwined with
other conduct exhibiting a pattern, as in the extortion hypothetical used
by the majority. '5
11. "R. v. Seaboyer: A Lost Cause?" (1991) 7 C.R. (4th) 225.
12. Supra note 1 at 158.
13. Ibid. at 159. Emphasis added. The inappropriateness of the similar fact analogy is
discussed, infra, in the text accompanying notes 33-36.
14. Supra note i I at 228-29. "The similar fact evidence rule expressly recognizes that
evidence of bad conduct of the accused is relevant via a generalization based on disposition,
but limits admission as a matter of policy. In contrast, the majority in Seaboyer categorically
prohibits any inferences based on a generalization that the complainant has a disposition to
consent or to bring false allegations. This should logically exclude all generalizations about a
disposition to consent no matter how "strikingly similar" the circumstances."
15. This approach bears some similarity to the reasoning inR. v. Crosby (1995), 39 C.R. (4th)
315 (S.C.C.). With respect to credibility, the Court found sexual history evidence admissible
where it was inextricably linked to some other evidence.
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We took the view, transferable to section 276, therefore, that there is
a bar on evidence that relies for its relevance on a generalization about
disposition to consent. Some other route to relevance must be found.
Applying this approach, section 276(2) would not be seen as an exception
to the general ban in section 276(1) but as applicable only to those
situations where some other route can be found, such as mistaken belief
in consent or identity.
Another way of stating this interpretation is through a focus on the
word "illegitimately" in the passage quoted above. Evidence cannot be
used illegitimately to show consent or lack of credibility. This is ambigu-
ous. It is not clear whether it means that it would in all cases be illegitimate
to use the evidence for such purposes or that use is only prohibited in those
cases where it is illegitimate. In other words, are there legitimate uses,
where section 276(2) would come into play to determine admissibility
even of consent evidence?
This is at the core of the differences of opinion among later commen-
tators. Professor David Paciocco explicitly disagreed with our attempt to
reconcile the prohibited propensity inference and the similar act scenario
in the process of arguing for an interpretation which envisages legitimate
uses of consent and credibility evidence.' 6
Paciocco argued that section 276(1) prohibits only general inferences
about consent and credibility. Specific inferences can be permitted if the
other requirements of subsection (2) and (3) are satisfied. I will call this
the narrow view of section 276(1), since it is limited in its exclusionary
effect. For Paciocco, it meant that the section was constitutional, (making
clear how impossible it is in this context to separate issues of constitution-
ality and interpretation). 7
If one applied Paciocco's approach to the story of John and Mary, it is
not clear what the outcome would be, since that would depend on whether
the inference was general or specific. On the one hand, the inference
could be seen as general, that is that women who have had sex with
abusive partners in the past are more likely to have consented. On the
other hand, while it is not clear how an inference could indeed be specific
(that is, not draw on some generalization about human behaviour), it may
16. "The New Rape Shield Provisions in Section 276 Should Survive Charter Challenge"
(1993) 21 C.R. (4th) 223, endorsed inR. v. Darrach (1994), 28 C.R. (4th) 201 (Ont. Prov. Div.),
at 212-213; R. v. J.(T.) (1994), 28 C.R. (4th) 195 (Ont. Gen. Div.); R. v. Ecker (1995), 37 C.R.
(4th) 51 (Sask. C.A.).
17. This presents difficulties when courts called upon to interpret the provisions are unlikely
to have the benefit of a full, or indeed any, constitutional analysis, in the absence of a direct
constitutional challenge.
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be possible to see it as a specific response to a generalization that women
do not have sex with abusive partners.
A different view was taken by both Hart Schartz 8 and Professor Ron
Delisle,'9 although with very different objectives in mind. Delisle was of
the view that evidence of sexual activity going to consent is rigidly
foreclosed. He used an example of A and B who have been living together
and engaging in sexual intercourse. Consent is the issue in a trial of A for
sexual assault. Delisle argued that the previous sex should be admissible
as some evidence going to consent. The fact that it cannot be admitted
makes section 276 unconstitutional.
Because of the absolute, rigid nature of the prohibition, which operates
regardless of whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the
potential prejudice to the trial's outcome, the legislation must be unconsti-
tutional for the same reasons given by the Court in Seaboyer .... 21
It is clear that Delisle would say that any pattern of sexual activity (or
possibly any sex at all) between the accused and the complainant should
be admitted and that section 276 would have to be declared unconstitu-
tional, (at least to the extent that it forbids this) in order to do so.
Schwartz, in general, shared Delisle's view that section 276(1) creates
an absolute prohibition against evidence of sexual activity, in and of
itself, being used on the issue of consent, the difference being that he sees
that as a positive quality, consistent with Seaboyer. He criticized Paciocco' s
analysis, as well as several Ontario cases, for admitting it,2' drawing
support from a number of recent cases a.2 However, he went on to open the
door to the possibility that sexual activity might sometimes be relevant to
consent via the similar act scenario. He states that it might require the
exercise of the "pornographic imagination" to decide what could meet the
requirements for the reception of similar act evidence, but suggests
"some form of ritual, such as the donning of costumes, or acquisition of
certain paraphernalia. ' 23 This raises the question of the appropriate
18. "Sex With the Accused on Other Occasions: the Evisceration of Rape Shield Protection"
(1994) 31 C.R. (4th) 232.
19. "Potential Charter Challenges to the New Rape Shield Law" (1992) 13 C.R. (4th) 390,
and "The New Rape Shield Law and the Charter" (1993) 42 U.N.B.L.J. 335.
20. Ibid. (U.N.B.L.J.) at 338. See now R.J. Delisle, Annotation toR. v. Crosby (1995), 39 C.R.
(4th) 315 (S.C.C.), pointing out that the trend in the case law is to adopt the narrow construction.
21. Supra note 18 at 236-240. For a reply, see D. Paciocco, "Techniques for Eviscerating The
Concept of Relevance: A Reply and Rejoinder to "Sex With The Accused on Other Occasions:
The Evisceration of Rape Shield Protection" (1995) 33 C.R. (4th) 365.
22. Ibid. at 240-42.
23. Ibid. at 243.
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approach to sexual activities which might be stigmatized as abnormal,
which I will return to below. 24
Thus one of the strongest voices in favour of a broad approach to
section 276(1) opens the door to the possibility that John may be able to
introduce the pattern evidence.
The views expressed in annotated Criminal Codes may be particularly
accessible and thus influential. David Watt and Michelle Fuerst, without
showing any awareness of the debate summarized above, simply assert
that "[s]ections 276(2) and (3), read together, enact an exception to the
general exclusionary rule of s.276(1) .... The evidence, otherwise barred,
may be received where the presiding judicial officer, after conducting a
hearing in accordance with s.276.1 and 276.2, determines that the
evidence" '25 meets the requirements of ss. 276(2) and (3).26
There is support in the case law for the view that section 276(1) does
not create an absolute bar to consent evidence. The Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal has addressed this issue, in a split decision, in Ecker.27 The
accused was charged with breaking and entering, and sexual assault. The
evidence in question was that the complainant, shortly before the alleged
offences, sat on the accused's knee in a bar and touched his genital area.
The trial judge, applying section 276(1), ruled this inadmissible. The
Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The majority focused on the idea that
the evil addressed by section 276 was the misuse of sexual history
evidence. It is inadmissible to support general inferences with respect to
consent or credibility. However, sexual history evidence may permit
other inferences, "specific, logical, and reasonable inferences grounded
in fact not myth".28 Thus "evidence of other consensual activity, espe-
cially between a complainant and an accused, may on occasion be
legitimately used.., to lay the basis for specific inferences relative to an
issue at trial, including consent or credibility". 29 The dissenting judge was
24. Schwartz recognizes the dangers, commenting that "[a]ttempts by jurists to spell out so-
called "normal" activity surrounding sexual conduct are sometimes laughable, often insensi-
tive, and in some instances dead wrong." Ibid. at 232.
25. 1996 Tremeear's Criminal Code (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 524.
26. E. Greenspan, Martin's Criminal Code 1996 (Toronto: Canada Law Books Inc., 1996)
is less clear but suggests a similar approach. The editor refers to s.276(1) as setting out the
purpose for which the evidence is not admissible, and then describes s.276(2) as codifying the
test-that evidence can only be excluded if the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the
probative value. G. Rodrigues, Crankshaw's Criminal Code, Cumulative Case Law Supple-
ment August 1995 (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) refers to a number of cases, notably R. v. Ecker
(1995), 37 C.R. (4th) 51 (Sask. C.A.), discussed below.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. at 71.
29. Ibid. at 71-72 [emphasis added]. See alsoR. v. Osolin (1993), 26 C.R. (4th) 1, at 24 per
Cory J., (Major and Iacobucci JJ. concurring). "Generally, a complainant may be cross-
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of the view that, given the reason for admission ("to challenge the
credibility of the complainant"), the evidence was clearly inadmissible
because of section 276(1). Even if the reason had been the one advanced
on appeal, (mistaken belief in consent), the evidence would not meet
admissibility requirements, given how "difficult it is to see how the
accused could infer consent to the second sexual encounter on the basis
of the alleged first touching."3
Where do we stand at the moment? It seems that the narrow view of
section 276(1), prohibiting only general inferences about consent and
credibility, has momentum. This is based on faith in two propositions,
both of which are questionable. One is that it is possible to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate uses. The second is that there is such
a thing as a specific inference.
It may be that the floodgates are already open to the admission of any
sexual history between the complainant and the accused,3' and so the
question of whether pattern evidence is admissible is irrelevant. How-
ever, the issue is yet to be authoritatively determined by the Supreme
Court of Canada, and it is important that there continues to be a challenge
to the idea that there is some proper evidentiary use to be made of prior
sexual activity.
To apply this general discussion to the pattern issue, the question is
whether it is completely barred by section 276(1) as going to consent, or
does the analysis proceed to the balancing of probativeness and preju-
dice? I would start from the proposition that section 276(1) must have
some content, so that we cannot go straight to the balancing analysis in all
cases. Furthermore, section 276(1) must have some content with respect
to sexual activity between the complainant and the accused. There is some
evidence that Parliament has determined is totally inadmissible, and is
not subject to judicial discretion. The question then becomes a matter of
examined for the purpose of eliciting evidence relating to consent and pertaining to credibility
when the probative value of that evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice which might flow from it."
30. Ecker, supra note 26 at 89. It is indeed difficult to see how the majority thought that it
could be escaping stereotypical thinking in seeing the evidence as potentially admissible. The
generalizations seem to be that a woman who had touched a man's genitals in a bar was more
likely to have consented to sex on a later occasion, and that a person may deduce consent to
sex on one occasion from a sexual touching on another. Neither of these meet the test of being
specific, logical and reasonable. The court does not address the problem of how to give any
content to s.276(1) in relation to complainant/accused evidence if such evidence is admissible.
31. An example could beR. v.J.(T) (1994), 28 C.R. (4th) 195 (Ont. Gen. Div.) where the court
simply admitted evidence of a past sexual relationship, saying, at 197, that to "accept into
evidence the full history of the relationship of the parties ... is not inconsistent with the
intention of s. 276 or ... Seaboyer."
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what lifts particular evidence out of the subsection (1) prohibition and
into the (2) and (3) balancing.3 2
One argument, drawing on Schwartz, could be that there is something
distinctive and unusual about the sexual activity, bearing on the question
of consent, that transcends the mere "she consented before so she
consented this time" line of reasoning. While that could sometimes
permit 'consent' evidence, there is support in Seaboyer for the idea that
similar act evidence can sometimes be relevant.
Even evidence as to pattern of conduct may on occasion be relevant. Since
this use of evidence of prior sexual conduct draws upon the inference that
prior conduct infers similar subsequent conduct, it closely resembles the
prohibited use of the evidence and must be carefully scrutinized .... 33
What the Court seems to be saying here is that the similar fact rule can be
applied to evidence about the complainant.3 4 A recent ruling from the
Supreme Court of Canada can be found in R. v. B (F.F.).35 This case
reverts to the rule that evidence of similar acts cannot be admitted simply
to show propensity, that is, that the accused is a person likely to have
committed the offence. (The parallel to this would be that sexual history
evidence cannot be admitted simply to show propensity to have sex.) The
evidence must relate to some other fact or matter in issue, such as motive,
32. There may be some similarities between the issue, i.e. the extent to which Parliament has
deferred to the exercise of judicial discretion, and the issue which is likely to arise if Bill C-46
(on the production of records in sexual assault cases) becomes law. After First Reading, the
draft Bill attempted to limit the records which can be seen as "likely relevant" and thus
producable, by providing a list of assertions which are not sufficient "on their own" to meet the
test. An example is the assertion that the record may disclose a prior inconsistent statement (Bill
C-46, s. 1, amending s.278.3(4)). A judge howeve, may balance the "salutory and deleterious
effects" of production for review, taking into account factors very similar to the ones set out
in s.276(3). The structure is similar since an accused should have to point to 'something more'
than the listed irrelevancies in order to get to the balancing exercise. It seems likely that
resistence to legislative limitation of judicial discretion and confidence in judicial ability to
apply fairly such vague concepts as relevance will mean that it will be made as easy as possible
to proceed to the balancing stage.
33. Supra note 1 at 142. One of the sources cited is R. v. Wald (1989), 47 C.C.C. (3d) 315
(Alta. C.A.). Here a majority of the Court stated in obiter, at 340, that if there was evidence of
sexual activity with "very distinctive characteristics" then this could be admissible. "It could
indicate a disposition to consent to sexual activity of that very distinctive kind or in those very
distinctive circumstances. Such evidence should be admitted in circumstances roughly
analogous to those in which similar fact evidence is admitted."
34. It is not clear to me whether what is intended is that a mirror image of the rule as it relates
to an accused be applied, or whether there is room for some contextual adaptation of the rule
to the different situations of the complainant and the accused.
35. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 697. See L. Hanson, "R. v. B(F.F.) Revisited: Possibilities for Admitting
Similar Fact Evidence Via Relevance to Other Matters in Issue" (1994) 20 Queen's L.J. 139.
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opportunity, or identity. Possibly the most relevant hook to hang rel-
evance on is the one relating to striking similarity, or a system.3 6
It is difficult to apply this to sexual history. With respect to the accused,
the issue does not arise in relation to normal activities. He is charged with
a criminal offence, which at least in a positivistic sense, takes the
behaviour out of the realm of the "normal". There is no parallel between
having sex and committing an offence. Hence the temptation to create an
offence-like analogy, by introducing the idea of distinctive sexual prac-
tices, unravels very quickly. Thus, we start from the assumption that the
accused did not commit the offence so evidence that he has done
strikingly similar things before may help us infer that he did. We do not
start from the assumption that the complainant did not consent, so that we
need similar fact evidence to infer that she did. We start from the
assumption that she did consent (via the presumption of innocence). The
Crown must then prove that she did not, and does not normally seek
evidence of a pattern of non-consent to assist it in this task. One has to
superimpose an assumption on top of the assumption of non-consent, that
is that the complainant would only consent to "non-distinctive" or normal
sex, in order to make sense of drawing on evidence of strikingly similar
abnormal sex to help us infer that she did consent.
There are dangers in setting up a dichotomy of distinctive and non-
distinctive sex so that pattern evidence of distinctive sex can be admitted
as going to consent. Apart from the obvious difficulties of classification,
there is the risk that people seen as engaging in distinctive sexual
practices will be marginalized and given less respect for their sexual
autonomy.37 Assume for example that the cohabitants are lesbian. Is
lesbian sexual activity distinctive? On what basis would we take a pattern
of lesbian activity into account in determining consent any more than
'ordinary' heterosexual activity. The distinction between general and
specific inferences does not assist since any inference has to draw on a
generalization that a woman who has consented to engage in lesbian
sexual activity in the past is more likely to have consented on the occasion
in question.
36. See R. v. Green, [198811 S.C.R. 228, where the evidence was admitted because it showed
that the accused had a system in that previous incidents were strikingly similar. The accused
was convicted of sexually assaulting a young girl by touching her breasts. He claimed this was
accidental touching in the course of a hug. Evidence of other children that he had touched them
in a sexual way was admitted.
37. Sheila Duncan argues in "Law's Sexual Discipline: Visibility, Violence, and Consent"
(1995) 22 J. Law and Soc. 326, that the law disciplines bodies differentially as between
different genders and different sexual orientations. She notes that it "is a central argument of
this study [Foucault's History of Sexuality] that pleasures outside of or unrelated to hetero-
sexual intercourse are constructed outside of the normal .. "
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A propensity inference that is permissible for certain groups but not
others justifies concern about the selective protection of the law. While
the story of John and Mary does not raise the issue directly it may be that
the most practical context in which this concern could arise would involve
sado-masochistic forms of sexual expression. There are two probl*ems
here. First, there is the danger that an abusive relationship be construed
as sado-masochistic. Second, there might be a readiness to reason that a
person who actually did engage in sado-masochistic sex in the past was
more likely to have consented to this type of sex on the occasion in
question, that is, that they might be a "lesser species", a mere bundle of
predictable propensities.38
Assuming a commitment to the idea that there must be fresh consent
on each occasion, it may be argued that there is no reason to treat the most
unusual sexual habits (if we know what they are) as any different to those
perceived as normal. One may in the past have had sex with one's partner
hanging from the chandelier instead of in the missionary position, but
38. The question of whether there was consent to sado-masochistic sex is separate from the
issue of whether consent is effective as a defence, although the two issues are interconnected.
There has been a number of cases recently touching on the perspective which the law should
adopt to consent in this context. For example, in R. v. Welch (1995), 43 C.R. (4th) 225 (Ont.
C.A.), the accused was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm. The complainant
testified that the accused tied her to his bed, beat her with a belt on the breasts and buttocks,
inserted his finger into her vagina and an object into her rectum. The accused testified that she
consented, vigorously encouraging him to continue. The Court held, following R. v. Jobidon
[ 1991] 2 S.C.R. 714, that consent is not a defence to sexual assault causing bodily harm, stating
at 249-250:
The sadistic sexual activity here involved bondage... and the intentional infliction of
injury to the body and rectum of the complainant. The consent of the complainant,
assuming it was given, cannot detract from the inherently degrading and dehumanizing
nature of the conduct. Although the law must recognize individual freedom and
autonomy, when the activity in question involves pursuing sexual gratification by
deliberately inflicting pain upon another that gives rise to bodily harm, then the personal
interest of the individuals involved must yield to the more compelling societal interests
which are challenged by such behaviour.
There are a number of issues arising out of the complex interaction of substantive law and
evidence here. It would be ironic if there were certain distinctive sexual practices to which we
could not consent at all, while there were others which facilitated the finding of consent.
Respect for sexual autonomy and physical integrity underlies the rejection of pattern evidence
no matter what the level of distinctiveness, but is there a point where the values of sexual
autonomy and physical integrity part company? Of more direct relevance is the fact that the
accused was permitted to testify about earlier occasions on which he and the complainant had
"rough sex". The judgment does not reveal why this evidence was admitted. The case illustrates
that there are different ways in which willingness to look at such sexual history is linked to a
low value given to sexual autonomy. The law may shade through some attention to (hetero?)sexual
autonomy through treating certain sexual behaviour as outlaw (in the sense that less legal
protection may be given) to outright rejection of certain activities, whatever the perspective of
the participants.
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does that help the fact finder resolve a conflict of evidence over whether
chandelier sex was consensual on the occasion in question?
The problem, however, is the fact finder may lack information about
the range of sexual practices in the world and reach a conclusion as to non-
consent based on an assumption that no one could possibly have con-
sented to activities perceived as bizarre. Further, the fact finder could be
as open-minded about sex as it is possible to be but the defence may still
fear a rejection of the defence version of what happened.
An illustration may be found in a case which I consider to be a
progressive one in this field, R. v. R.G.39 The appellant was charged with
assault and sexual assault on his estranged wife, who had brought the
children for a visit. The appellant assaulted the complainant in a fit of
anger, tearing her clothing, bruising her arm and scratching her breast.
She lay down with the children as they were falling asleep by the
fireplace. Her evidence was that after some time he lay down beside her,
and intercourse followed, while she lay crying on the floor, not daring to
protest. The following morning, she again submitted to sexual activities,
fearing that he would become violent again. She also testified that there
had been many verbal fights during the marriage, and that physical abuse,
while kept to a minimum by her submissive nature, occurred from time
to time.
He testified that he felt badly after what he claimed was a consensual
fight, and wanted to comfort her. They engaged in what was normal sex
for them, the way it had always been after they had argued and were
making up. She at no time indicated that she did not want to have sex or
resist his advances. The trial judge preferred the evidence of the com-
plainant and found that none of the acts of sexual intercourse were
consensual stating that "the responsibility is his to make sure that he has
an unequivocal consent".4" On appeal it was argued that the trial judge
erred in suggesting that there was an onus on the accused to show
unequivocal consent before he could argue mistaken belief; that the trial
judge erred in placing an onus on the accused to show that he took
reasonable steps to ascertain consent, there being little or no need for
inquiry given the perception of the accused of two lovers "making up"
after a quarrel, and that the accused had indeed taken reasonable steps.
It can be seen therefore that the case is about mistaken belief in consent
and in particular the new section 273.2(b), requiring reasonable steps, in
the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ground such a
39. (1994), 38 C.R. (4th) 123 (B.C.C.A.).
40. Ibid., at 129.
Sexual Assault in Abusive Relationships
defence.4' The notable thing for the purposes of this paper was that the
accused argued that what happened was consistent with their previous
making up behaviour after quarrels. In that context, Wood J.A., speaking
for himself and Macfarlane J.A., stated:
His attempt to characterize what followed [the assault] as normal sex in the
context of "making up" after a fight, is an affront both to the law and to
common sense.
The notion that any woman, who has just been assaulted to the point where
panic caused her to become physically sick, would then freely consent to
have sex with the man responsible for her anguish, is one that defies belief
in a civilized country which has given constitutional protection to the
dignity and worth of the individual. As I have already noted, in such
circumstances it would require the most compelling evidence of a subse-
quent unequivocal indication of consent by the complainant to give a
defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent any air of reality.42
On one level, and indeed in the context of the case, what this means is that
once a woman has been assaulted, that will be a significant factor in the
"circumstances known to the accused" which will affect the content of the
reasonable steps requirement. A stance of extreme scepticism to a
mistaken belief defence seems to be appropriate here. However, the quote
above also provides support for the view that not only should the accused
take steps commensurate with extreme scepticism but also that there is a
"common sense" rejection of the possibility of consent itself. If this
common sense rejection can be anticipated then the accused may be
justified in trying to counter it with evidence of previous sexual activity
in similar situations.
In other words, John may not simply be inviting an illegitimate
deduction of consent from previous occasions but trying to counteract a
negative common sense reaction in the fact finder. In other words he may
not be saying: "She consented before so she consented this time" but
"Don't reject my argument out of hand because you think a woman would
never have sex after she had been assaulted by her partner."
Further support for this as a legitimate fear can be found in R. v.
Lavallee.43 Madame Justice Wilson, speaking for the majority, stated:
The average member of the public (or of the jury) can be forgiven for
asking: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why
41. For a discussion see J. Mclnnis & C. Boyle, "Judging Sexual Assault Law Against a
Standard of Equality" (1995) 29 U.B.C. L. Rev. 341.
42. Supra note 39 at 131. The open statement of the assumptions about human behaviour
animating the approach to fact determination in this case stands in considerable contrast to the
approach of the S.C.C. in Sansregret v. R. (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 193, with its doctrinal
manipulation of the doctrine of wilful blindness.
43. Lavallee, supra note 9.
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should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner
who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the
woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she
not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the
average person confronted with the so-called "battered wife syndrome".
We need help to understand it and help is available from trained profes-
sionals."4
Lavallee makes clear that just because a woman stays in a relationship
does not mean that she is not being battered. The Court relied heavily on
research by Dr. Lenore Walker, which formed the basis of her "Cycle
Theory of Violence". This theory is that there are three distinct phases in
a battering cycle: tension building; acute battering; and loving contri-
tion.45 John could argue that he needs to show the court that consensual
sex has taken place in the loving contrition phase in the past, in order to
anticipate a common sense rejection.
It can be seen therefore that there is judicial support for the idea that
the average person is likely to assume that a battered woman would leave
her partner rather than staying with him (and having consensual sex with
him). I have found no similar authorities to draw on with respect to an
anticipated reaction to "unusual" sexual practices, so I will stay with
Mary and John for the moment, while remembering that the issues go
beyond battering relationships.4 6 It may be useful to continue the analysis
in three stages:
(a) on the assumption that the defence is incorrect in anticipating a
common sense rejection;
(b) on the assumption that the defence is correct in anticipating a
common sense rejection; and
(c) by asking how courts should approach such assertions of common
sense.
(a) If the defence is incorrect in its assertion of common sense, then
I would argue that there is no justification for admission of the evidence.
Use of such evidence would simply invite an inference from consent in
the past, even if there is some perceived distinctiveness. Even people
perceived by others as engaging in odd sexual practices deserve, and may
44. Ibid. at 112.
45. See sources cited, ibid. at 117.
46. Some research has been done on sexual attitudes. See K. Wellings et al., "Sexual
Attitudes", in A. Johnson et al. eds., Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles (Oxford: Blackwell
Scientific Publications, 1994), Ch. 8. There is evidence, for example, that older people are more
likely to think that sexual intercourse should not occur before marriage, although acceptance
of pre-marital sex is now nearly universal, and that women tend to be more accepting than men
of same-sex relationships, although homophobic attitudes are widespread.
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especially need, to be shielded from the generalization that they did it
before so they did it again. Either this is completely barred by section
276(1) or it is an illegitimate inference in its lack of respect for individual
autonomy. If such evidence were admitted then section 276(1) would
have no content with respect to sexual activity between the accused and
the complainant.
(b) If the assertion is correct, then the issue becomes more complex.
I find the argument that the defence should be able to counter the
'common sense' rejection quite persuasive. That does not mean however
that pattern evidence should be admissible, but that more than a straight-
forward inference is involved. Arguably that is enough to take the
argument out of section 276(1) and into the probativeness/prejudice
balancing exercise in section 276(2) and (3). There are a number of points
that might be useful in that balancing exercise.
First, while there are certainly benefits in looking at the broader
context of any legal issue, there are recognized dangers here that an
examination of the context can distort the search for truth. The problem
partly lies in the complex cultural meaning of sexual activity, but also the
impossibility of truly examining the whole context. It would be an
enormous task to look at the whole sexual history of a relationship.
Focusing on make-up sex after abuse is only part of the picture, a part
chosen to assist the defence. To put that part in context in turn would
require an examination, at the very least, into whether and how often
Mary refused to have such sexual contact after abuse and whether there
had been any sexual components to the abuse before. This carries with it
the obvious danger of turning the trial into an investigation of the entire
relationship rather than into a single allegation of assault. 47 Such a
profusion problem, akin to the concerns underlying the collateral fact
rule, which sets limits on reply evidence in order to avoid a multiplicity
of side issues, can be taken into account under section 276(3)(h), relating
to any other relevant factor.
Second, is there any other way of addressing the defence concerns?
Sexual history evidence is not the only way to address anticipated jury
reactions. Other evidence, not the subject of Parliamentary concern or of
co-existing constitutional rights, could be used. For example, expert
47. The point I am making here has todo with the impossibility of examining the whole sexual
context. Ideally, however, once one moves beyond testimony having to do with the events in
question, there is no logical stopping point. If part of the picture is to be painted, then I would
like to know about Mary's material and emotional circumstances and the realistic options she
had at any particular time. This of course is impossible and carries its own significant costs and
potential for prejudice.
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evidence on the cycle theory of violence could be introduced,48 showing
that abusive relationships are not necessarily unremittingly brutal, but
can move through different phases. The court can be informed about
physical, emotional and financial constraints, and the frequent need for
time and support in order to come forward with a complaint, whether the
assault is of a sexual nature or not. The court can be informed about what
the Supreme Court of Canada has had to say in Lavallee about the
unreliability of "common sense" assumptions about human behaviour in
this context.
It is legitimate for ajudge to incorporate within the notion of probative
value whether there are other ways of achieving a legitimate defence goal.
Even assuming that individual evidence has more probative value than
human behaviour evidence, it is the difference between the two that
should go into the balance. This could be taken into account both under
section 276(3)(a) in that the accused is not deprived of his right to make
full answer and defence if there is another way to make the same point,
and under section 276(3)(h), which permits the judge to look at any other
factor.
While the defence may argue that it should not be confined to
testimony about behaviour in general when there is better evidence
available about the behaviour of the specific individuals, there are a
number of reasons why this is not persuasive. First, the danger being
addressed is a general one about human nature, which can reasonably be
addressed on that level. Second, evidence that does not raise concerns
about the equality rights of witnesses in sexual assault trials should be
preferred over evidence which does. Third, there is the danger of
prejudice, that the jury may go beyond counteracting their common sense
rejection and go on to draw the illegitimate consent inference, a danger
not, or less, present with more general human behaviour evidence.
In sum, if the defence concern is that the jury might base its decision
on an erroneous assumption about human behaviour, the response should
be to openly challenge such assumptions rather than to invite the jury to
deduce that there was consensual sex on the occasion in question because
there had been consensual sex before.
48. See Lavallee, supra note 9 at 117-118. See R.A. Schuller, "The Impact of Battered
Woman Syndrome Evidence on Jury Decision Processes" (1992) 16 Law and Human
Behaviour 597. Analysis of simulated jury deliberations showed that expert testimony led to
interpretations more favourable to a battered woman's claim of self-defence. This is not to
suggest that expert evidence does not carry its own dangers of distortion and bias. The point
is simply that the concern that the fact finder may assume that a person would not consent to
sex after being beaten up can be met in ways other than through evidence of the relationship
in question.
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(c) This takes us to a more complex question, avoided in the
discussion above. How should courts approach assertions about the
common sense of fact finders? Is one reduced to counter-assertion?
Lavallee raises an interesting evidential question about how the Court
knew what the average member of the public thinks. Judicial notice seems
to have been taken of this social background information. 9 Now of course
there is the additional question of how to determine whether the average
member of the public still thinks the same thing.
Evidence arguments are replete with assertions about common sense.
Indeed the whole evidence edifice seems to be based on faith in our ability
to make common sense generalizations underlying decisions both about
admissibility and weight. Nevertheless, where one party is simply mak-
ing an empirical assertion (people think that battered women would not
consent to sex with their batterers) there should be some responsibility to
support that assertion. This is especially the case where the assertion
forms the basis for admission of evidence recognized as potentially
harmful to witnesses and to the search for truth.
In effect, in our example John is asking the court to take judicial notice
of public attitudes to battered women. When one tests the assertion
against the requirements for judicial notice, then it can be argued that
knowledge of these attitudes is not so notorious that there will be no
dispute among reasonable people.50 This argument may be reinforced by
seeing Lavallee, not simply as a counteraction to prevailing public
attitudes, but as an important aspect of the change in such attitudes.
However, a recognition that Lavallee took a rather casual approach to
proof of what the average person thinks, and that sexual history evidence
should not be admitted on a bald assertion that it is necessary to neutralize
an uninformed negative reaction, does not address the much bigger
question of how vigorously to test empirical assertions in a world of
unevenly-available research.
49. There is some research on public attitudes. See M. Dodge & E. Greene, "Jurors and Expert
Conceptions of Battered Women" (1991) 6 Violence and Victims 271; C.P. Ewing & M.
Aubrey, "Battered women and Public Opinion: Some Realities About the Myths" (1987) 2 J.
Fam. Violence 257; K.M. Gentemann, "Wife Beating: Attitudes of aNon-Clinical Population"
(1984) 9 Victimology: An International Journal 109; E. Greene, A. Raitz & H. Lindblad,
"Jurors' Knowledge of Battered Women" (1989)4 J. Fain. Violence 105; D.G. Saunders et al.,
"The Inventory of Beliefs About Wife Beating: The Construction and Initial Validation of a
Measure of Beliefs and Attitudes" (1987) 2 Violence and Victims 39. The most recent study
by M. Dodge and E. Greene, found, at 280-1, that jurors were less knowledgeable than
researchers about the fact that e.g. a battered woman might stay if the batterer promises not to
hurt her again or because she feels dependent. However, while they felt that experts can supply
information that is beyond the jurors' ken, on the whole jurors, especially younger jurors, did
not subscribe to myths about battered women.
50. Supra note 6 at 976.
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II. The Timing Issue
There is an additional issue to be addressed in the case of John and Mary.
It is not a straightforward case of a conflict of evidence over consent, per
se. The conflict goes deeper than that to the timing and context of the
sexual assault. Mary says that there was a sexual component to the
assault. John says consensual sex took place later after time for contrition
and conversation. So, to simplify the issue somewhat, there is a conflict
over timing as well as consent. Can past sexual history be admitted as
going to the timing and circumstances of sexual activity? In other words,
can the accused say we had a pattern of abuse followed by sex, so it more
likely that that is what happened than that I raped her as part of an assault?
This is a significant issue. Assume that the courts adopt the view that
section 276(1) is an absolute bar to 'consent' evidence. It could be argued
that the evidence in this case was going not to consent but simply the
likelihood of X (later sex) happening rather than Y (sex as part of the
assault). Thus the evidence could be seen as relevant to timing and
circumstances rather than consent. Thus, its admissibility could be
addressed through the probativeness/prejudice balancing exercise in
section 276(2) and (3).51
A number of arguments can be made that this evidence is still
inadmissible. First, to say that the evidence makes it more likely that there
was later consensual sex rather than earlier non-consensual sex is still to
argue that the evidence goes to consent. Second, it has little if any
probative value. The fact that X happened before does not help to resolve
a conflict over whether X or Y happened on this occasion. How can
evidence that Mary consented in certain circumstances in the past help to
show that she was not raped in different circumstances on this occasion?
The argument that the previous pattern is helpful to choosing which
version of events to believe is essentially based on the good character of
the accused. The discussion so far has proceeded on the assumption that
the focus of the inquiry is the behaviour of the complainant. Did she
consent? Can we look at her past sexual life with the accused to help us
decide if she consented? The issue changes if we remind ourselves to
focus on the behaviour of the accused. John is saying "let me introduce
evidence of my past behaviour. In the past I have abused my partner,
51. One could I suppose take a very pedantic view of the admissibility of the later sex. John
is denying that Y (sex as part of the assault) took place at all, and wishes to lead evidence of
X (later sex). In other words the argument could be that X does not go to consent but rather to
whether Y took place at all. This sidesteps the problem of the consent bar (if any) but begs the
question of what probative quality the later sex has. How does his version help to test or throw
doubt on her version?
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expressed contrition and then had consensual sex with her, so you can
infer that is what happened this time. In other words he is saying "infer
that I did not rape Mary because in the past I said I was sorry and waited
for consensual sex". To a certain extent this is evidence of bad character,
but its significance lies in its attempted use as support for the accused's
goodcharacter. The crucial inference here from the accused's perspective
is that he did not rape her in the past so he did not rape her this time. It is
important to examine the generalization that underlies any claim to
probativeness for this evidence. It is that people who have had consensual
sex in the past would not rape their partners.
What little, if any, probative value such good character evidence may
have, should be seen as outweighed by the danger of the evidence being
used for an impermissible inference of propensity inconsistent with
respect for sexual autonomy on each occasion.
Conclusion
The analysis has so far raised some difficult questions which begin as an
exercise in statutory interpretation. However, it is impossible to separate
the meaning of section 276 from its constitutional validity. A narrow ( in
the sense that it does as little as possible to address the socio-legal
problem which is the focus of section 276) interpretation could ensure the
constitutional validity of the provisions. A broad approach could be seen
as fatally undermining constitutional validity. I have argued above for a
broad approach, albeit one that permits section 276(2) and (3) analysis
where something more than a straightforward consent inference is
involved. I have also argued that pattern evidence should not pass the
probative value/prejudice balancing test. While I have not included the
constitutional issues in this paper, it is implicit in my analysis that I think
this approach is constitutionally sound.
More fundamentally, the issue of the admissibility of the sexual history
of relationships raises difficult questions about legal reasoning. I have
argued that in essense we are in danger of classifying certain groups of
people, such as women in abusive relationships, and people considered
to engage in "distinctive" sexual practices, as creatures of their own
propensities rather than fully autonomous human beings. In order to do
this, I find myself questioning what is a commonplace of feminist
method-attention to context. Indeed it is standard for groups of people
who do not feel that their experiences are taken into account in the
framing of laws to argue for consideration of a broader context including
those experiences.
It seems odd in a sense therefore to be arguing that decisions should be
made about whether a sexual assault took place in a relationship without
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delving into the history of the relationship, which carries with it the risks
of an evidentiary sexual privilege. John's argument is an attractive one in
that it is in tune with the insight that fact finders bring their own cognitive
filters to the fact finding process and that ways should be sought to expose
and challenge these filters. However, I think that what is really happening
in the case of John and Mary is an attempt to introduce selective
contextual information which will reinforce dominant prejudices about
women. The attraction of John's argument is that it looks as if it is
challenging misconceptions about battered women, but in the end it is an
invitation to weaken respect for sexual autonomy. In other words it is a
progressive method in service of a regressive outcome.
